What have been some of the solutions to each of these problems that your authors have suggested? Which do you think have been most appropriate and why?
From the Peter Eigen article, "Corruption in a Globalized World" the solution to corruption has to involve a constructive partnership between gov't, the private sector and civil society.
Notes from the article:
* International Chamber of Commerce with Transparency International for the OECD treaty supporting anti-bribery principles and integrity standard.
* National Integrity System, not looking at separate institutions, but at interrelationships, interdependence, holistic approach.
* "horizontal accountability" where power is dispersed, separately accountable, systematic identification of gaps and weaknesses
* make corruption a high-risk, low return undertaking
* NGOs working with the private sector, creative dialogue, accountable governance to make the benefits of globalization fair, and building coalitions to fight corruption
From the Peter Richardson article, in the Simmons and Oudratt book:
Four major lessons on finding solution for corruption--
1) availability and dissemination of information regarding corruption is a powerful tool in drawing attention to corruption
2) cooperative approach is more effective than confrontation (i.e.
gov't, private sector, and civil society)
3) expert knowledge on how to design and implement system changes
4) building trust among all parties that no one will cheat by monitoring, implementation, and enforcement
1990 Anti-Corruption Campaign:
In 1993, Peter Eigen created Transparency International which supported national anti-corruption coalitions between civil society, business, and government). Other international actors involved were Int'l Chamber of Commerce, OECD, World Bank, IMF, and Regional Development banks.
* TI's annual Corruption Perceptions Index-ranked countries by levels of corruption, Bribe Payer's Index, and Sourcebook
* IMF and World Bank released the Declaration on Partnerships for Sustainable Growth
* Financial Action Task Force featured 15 "noncooperative" countries as potential havens for corruption
* Non-compliance equals to reduction or elimination aid packages
From Phil Williams article, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering"
Conclusion: Governance in area of organized crime, drug trafficking, and money laundering is seriously inadequate because of systemic conditions.
Williams suggests three levels of governance that have taken steps to deal with the issue of international crimes: the creation of international norms, information sharing among law enforcements, and education and eradication programs. These levels have been most effective when organizations have been able to coordinate on the multilateral stage.
Thailand found its solution in extrajudicial killings as part of the war of drugs. Even when former drug-traffickers joined the police program for protection, the corrupt police still killed the men.
Given your understanding of the problems and cases, can you think of (try to be specific) potential solutions that these attempts to solve such problems have overlooked?
For countries that have the resources like Singapore, they attempt to prevent corruption by paying their public official the same salaries as CEOs.
Legalization of the drug- they would be more easily regulated and prevented a serious abuse of the drug, and make the profit not worth the risks of the organized crime.
Bring up the story of Colombia for transborder criminality.
What kinds of incentives or disincentives do different states face when looking at these problems and what impact do they have on states' willingness to seek out cooperative arrangements?
Developing nation's incentives for ridding corruption are that allowing corruption to flourish reduces economic growth, especially injurious to the poor, can destabilize governments.
Rich countries that give out foreign aid to developing countries have an incentive to seek out cooperative arrangements to fight corruptions because according to the World Bank, "cost of corruption to developing countries may well exceed the annual total of all economic assistance."
The disincentives for developing nations to seek out cooperative arrangements in corruption include: corruption thought as useful for combating bureaucratic lethargy or intransigence (speed up the process) and unwillingness to reduce corruption under U.S. pressure thinking that US is trying to increase competitiveness.
The disincentives for rich nations to seek out cooperative arrangements in corruption include: reluctance to devote resources to assist anti-corruption efforts, globalization and rise in trade and capital flows with FDI automatically increases money laundering, and "safe haven" banks.
Incentive to seek cooperative arrangement to fight transborder criminality:
Injustice with extrajudicial killings and societal impact, "the Interior Ministry's list was 'poorly prepared and could have affected innocent people'... false information might have been submitted, for personal or business reasons"(13), and the end result was 2000 dead in 3 months, with "the major players in the drug trade left untouched" (15).
Disincentive to seek cooperative arrangement to fight transborder criminality:
Williams points out the benefits of organized crime. According to him, these include the "significant and beneficial multiplier effects in local, regional, and even national economies", "a major source of export earnings for states that have few licit products" and "a form of employment". (144).
This argument can be supported with the Greenfield article that suggests that the Asian fast-paced, work-centered lifestyle (along with the lack of opportunities available to some) is conducive to meth. Greenfield states, "Perhaps it's appropriate that speed is Asia's drug of choice, with an estimated 30 million users across th region. Hard work remains this part of the world's indomitable virtue" (Greenfield).