The Dragon and the Magi/ An analysis of China

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Nick Smith

By: Nicholas Smith (555-0290)

For: Dr. Anthony Seaboyer

Date: December 7th, 2009

Course Code: POLS 462

Heavyweight Bout: China's 'Peaceful Rise' and America's Suspicion

President Barack Obama is likely understating the case when he claims that China and America's relationship will help shape the 21st century. The impact that these two giants will have on the international stage cannot be exaggerated and their interactions will likely shape the 21st century in its entirety. America is the world's biggest economy, China's is the third largest; in terms of population, China tops the list and America sits comfortably in third; the two nations are also the largest consumers of oil and the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Combined the two nations make up almost a quarter of the world's population and one third of the world's GDP. When one also considers these two nations both have vetoes in the Security Council, it becomes very clear that there is little these two giants do not have an impact on.

2009 marks the thirty-year anniversary of America and China's re-established diplomatic ties and in that time the two nations have been relatively cooperative with one another. While there have certainly been points of contention, China and America have thus far managed to co-exist peacefully. However China's dramatic economic expansion since Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms of 1979 have seen China's economy double in size every eight years since. While this kind of growth has been somewhat mitigated by the recession, China has still been posting recent growth rates of 8% annually.� China is gaining more and more influence on the international stage, so much so that some international scholars have begun to discuss the possibility of a 'G2' between the two nations.

China's impressive economic expansion is matched only by its massive military build-up. For the last fifteen years China's military expenditure has also been growing by 10% or more annually.� While still only spending one sixth of what the United States spends on defence, China's military program has become a cause of concern for some Pentagon officials in the United States and has even led to China being dubbed 'the new Prussia'.� This rise in military spending, coupled with China's substantial economic expansion has made China the closest thing America has to a rival on the world stage.

China's rise in prominence, like America's status as a hegemonic superpower, is unparalleled in modern history. How these two nations interact with one another will have far-reaching effects on the rest of the world and while the two nations have co-existed with relative success thus far, this will likely change as China approaches economic and military parity with the US. This is not to say that a new Cold War is likely to break out between the two nations, but China cannot help but tread on some toes as it expands and America is wearing very big shoes. This essay will explore some of the more contentious issues that exist between China and the United States to demonstrate that some very problematic situations are waiting on the horizon. Aside from examining the direct relationship shared by America and China, this essay will also examine three very difficult areas of foreign policy for both nations, these being Taiwan, North Korea, and Iran. While there are a plethora of concerns which exist between China and America, this essay will be focusing primarily on problems of a militaristic nature. That is not to say that economics will be completely disregarded (as economic issues may play a substantial role in the determining of defence policy in America and China), but rather it will only be explored as it pertains to the aforementioned areas of study. In conducting this research I hope to answer the question of whether China's 'peaceful rise' can really avoid contention from the United States. There are two subjects that must be explored before I begin outlining the previously mentioned issues, the first of these is to elaborate on China's 'peaceful rise' policy.

China is well aware of the fact that other nations, particularly the US, will become nervous and possibly threatened at the prospect of China's development. Consequently, China's method of development has been one of non-interference and pleasant relations. This idea is so well entrenched in the Chinese psyche that a twelve-part documentary was aired in China outlining the rise and fall of the great empires of the past and how economics, not military aggression was the path to pursue.� China is well aware of the threat they present but they understand that an expanding economic power cannot be confronted with military force, by entrenching themselves as a financial powerhouse, they are presenting an asymmetric threat of sorts. China is also able to avoid confrontation by maintaining a foreign policy of non-interference, one that does not espouse the evangelical nature of foreign policies that have emerged from monotheistic societies.� While China's intentions seem benign, this essay will outline how even a peaceful rise will lead to conflict (again, not necessarily conflict of a military nature).

The second subject I wish to discuss is the security dilemma theory. As stated earlier in this essay, I do not believe that China and America will confront one another in a militaristic fashion. However, the ideas encapsulated by the security dilemma theory demonstrate how even two nations that are looking to avoid conflict may in fact be inadvertently working towards it. A security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even armed conflict, over security concerns, even though neither of the states actually desire it.� It is a self-perpetuating cycle in a way as any attempt that one state makes to increase its own security may cause the other to act similarly, thereby actually decreasing overall security. World War I serves as an example of a security dilemma that reached a critical mass, but security dilemmas are often said to arise out of a failure to communicate between states and a lack of transparency, an issue very relevant to the Sino-American relationship. The concept of a security dilemma is important to keep in mind throughout this essay.

The Dragon and the Eagle: Sino-American Relations

The difference between the rise of America versus the rise of China can be found in culture. America's culture was very similar to Britain's which facilitated a more peaceful transition. Obviously this is not the case with China. China is a nation with a strikingly different history and set of traditions and this shows itself in the way China conducts itself on the world stage. Where America's rise to prominence was one of war and aggression, China has opted to maintain a policy of non-interference. However this does not mean that China has failed to accumulate influence, rather they have built up a substantial supply of what Joseph Nye dubs 'soft power'.� An excellent example of this is China's large stake in the American Treasury. Currently China holds the largest amounts of American Federal reserves with almost 25% of them.� With over 800 billion USD of America's debt, China is the world's biggest creditor while America remains the world's biggest debtor. The kind of influence that this gives China cannot be overstated and while it would be ruinous to both America and China's economies for China to exploit this debt, this disparity is a painful reminder to Americans that there is more to politics than military might alone.

Rather than building a US style power with arms and aggression, China's emerging influence is based on economic strength and Chinese leaders understand the goal for China is not conflict, but the avoidance of conflict.� Were China to push its weight around, Washington would be able to respond with a set of effective policies that would take advantage of the natural balancing process by which Japan and perhaps others would come together to limit China's emerging power. China's biggest problems have to do with the universality of its power. While China views itself as a nation with the intent of rising peacefully, a change or shift in the balance of power has the likely outcome of upsetting other nations. China's sheer size, the sheer volume of the commodities it consumes cannot help but change the nature of the international system and in ways that are not beneficial to the West. In Africa for example trade between China and the continent has increased at around 50% annually and Chinese investments are growing even faster.� In many African nations economic growth is at record heights but China has acted to quell resentment by pledging at a Sino-African summit in 2006 to double aid to Africa in two years; provide 5 billion USD in loans and credits; set up a 5 billion USD fund to encourage more Chinese investment; cancel much of the debt owed by Africa to China; train 15,000 more African professionals; provide greater access to the Chinese market and so on.� There is nothing wrong with this kind of investment except that as China moves into Africa it is taking up much of the political, economic, and military space previously occupied by the US. This pursuit also has military implications for Taiwan. Even though seven of the twenty-six governments that recognize Taiwan are African, six have switched their recognition to Beijing in the last decade because of this kind of investment.� This is a clear example of how China's use of soft power has had implications of a military nature.

In Asia, China's use of soft power has also been very effective. In the 1980s China had virtually no relations with much of East Asia, by 2007 China was holding joint military exercises with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, China's influence is so prevalent in the region that a 2007 poll found that countries like Thailand and Indonesia, traditional American allies, trusted China over America to wield global power.�

While China's focus has been on an expansion of soft power, it has also pursued some rather ambitious military projects that have been a cause for concern for many US officials. China has accused America of harbouring a 'Cold War' attitude towards China in terms of trying to contain its expansion and this may not be completely without warrant.� America has become India's most important source for military procurement with arms purchases in 2007 at around 10.5 billion USD. � China is beginning to grow concerned that America is 'wooing' India away from Russia and China and feeding India's ambition to match China force by force in its ever-burgeoning arms sales to India. As a clear demonstration of this worry, China's last Defence White Paper has described the increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific as a 'prominent security concern'.� America's fervent pursuit of alliances with Japan and India have contributed to this worry and with American ships and spy-planes claiming the right to operate a mere twelve nautical miles from the Chinese coast, it is clear these worries are well-founded.

China is not completely innocent in this process of military procurement either. China is quietly constructing its first aircraft carrier and the Pentagon believes it will have successfully constructed two by the end of 2020.� This marks a major shift in Chinese defence policy. Previously only concerned with protecting itself and its frontiers, the construction of these aircraft carriers suggest that Chinese naval interests are no longer confined strictly to coastal defence. The Chinese military has also denied Pentagon officials access to Chinese military headquarters and though the two defence ministries have set up a hot line, it has never been used. This lack of transparency is exactly the kind of issue outlined by security dilemma theory.

Perhaps even more disconcerting for American officials is the development of China's space program. China is only the third nation to have launched a man into space with its own national program and recent developments in the space program in Wenchang demonstrate that China's interstellar plans are even more ambitious. China's space program is controlled by the military and operates under a cloak of secrecy that frustrates many Pentagon officials.� The new launch centre on the island of Hainan is set to be opened in 2013 and later that year China's 'Long March 5' rocket is set to conduct a manned lunar landing.� The construction of this rocket comes just as America decommissions its space shuttle program leaving manned missions to the International Space Station (ISS) grounded until the Orion spacecraft are ready.� America is understandably concerned about China's developing space program and are still seething at China's test of an anti-satellite missile in 2007 which blew up an old weather satellite, leaving thousands of pieces of debris in orbit.�

Closely related to China's military development is the issue of Taiwan. Taiwan is by far the most contentious issue that exists between China and America when it comes to military matters. In the near future, America will have to break a longstanding treaty with at least one of these nations and the implications of this could have a dramatic impact on the Sino-American relationship.

Taiwan

Taiwan is the largest island in the Republic of China (ROC) and has served as the political hub of the ROC since 1949. When the Kuomintang, a Chinese nationalist party, was forced to the islands by the Communist party during the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan was recognized officially as China and Chiang Kai-shek (President of the ROC) even signed the Charter of the United Nations as the official Chinese representative. Since 1979 and Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms which opened the Chinese market to the rest of the world, mainland China has been officially recognized by the United States and the rest of the world as 'China' and the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty has been a problem ever since.

America does not officially recognize Taiwan as a nation, but maintains de facto relations with the small island. In fact, Taiwan is America's ninth largest trading partner with bilateral trade topping 58 billion USD in 2007.� Taiwan and America's good relations stem from a bilateral agreement known as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. This Act requires the United States "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."� It also stipulates that America will protect Taiwan from any attempt to manipulate the nation by force, embargoes, or boycotts. However the TRA does not necessarily require the US to intervene should the People's Republic of China (mainland China) invade. Instead America has taken a position of 'strategic ambiguity' on the matter.� This matter is complicated by the 1982 joint communiqué between China and America which mandates that America's arm sales to Taiwan not exceed 'in either quantitative or qualitative terms' the level of those supplied in the three years prior to the agreement.� These two treaties have not been followed to the letter since their respective signings, but they have never faced a political environment like the one the currently exists.�

The number of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan is estimated at anywhere between 1,000 and 1,500.� The number of missiles is believed to have increased by 150% in the last two years and it has been reported that China has already developed and is continuing to develop medium-range ballistic missiles. These missiles could reach targets far out in the Pacific and are also being targeted at American bases in Japan and Guam.� China's stunning build-up in military resources has provided them with one of the biggest missile programs in the world according to the Pentagon and has created what the Centre for Strategic & International Studies calls a 'strategic mistrust' between the US and China.� China's build-up puts America in an awkward position. It is obliged, under the 1979 TRA to provide Taiwan with sufficient arms to defend itself, yet according the 1982 communiqué, it cannot exceed the amount of aid it was providing annually between 1979 and 1982. If China continues to develop missiles and point them at Taiwan, how is America supposed to sufficiently arm Taiwan yet remain within the 1982 communiqué limits? This is an obvious area of contention for all the governments involved, particularly because President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan has just requested a new fleet of F-16s while Beijing continues to pressure the US to halt or at least decrease its levels of arm sales.� And if this issue couldn't be exacerbated enough, 2012 will see simultaneous elections in all three nations, the outcomes of which could make the issue even more of a problem.

Currently, Taiwan is under the government of President Ma Ying-jeou, a moderate Taiwanese who is looking to negotiate with mainland China to try and increase Taiwan's participation in international organizations. He claims he will only enter these negotiations if China removes all the missiles aimed at Taiwan from China. Of course this will never happen, but a reduction in these arms would show a lot to the Taiwanese people and would help establish good ties between the two governments. If China continues on its current path however it is likely that the 2012 election in Taiwan will see the removal of President Ma (already unpopular) for the much more nationalist, thus much less willing to negotiate, Democratic Progressive Party.� The conundrum that America will find itself in should cross-strait relations sour would be diplomatically problematic to deal with and would hurt relations with at least one of the two governments. Yet China has shown no willingness to decrease its military build-up along the Strait despite American cautioning on the matter.�

Taiwan presents an interesting problem for the United States and China and the outcome will largely be determined by both superpowers' abilities to negotiate and understand their opposition's position. While unlikely to escalate into a military engagement, past incidents do provide some cause for concern.�

North Korea

North Korea is an interesting subject because America and China both share the common interest of preventing it from going nuclear, but at the same time, China would much rather see a stable, nuclear North Korea than one in political meltdown or worse still, one occupied by American troops.� As long as North Korea continues to be only a mild belligerent, China and America's interests with regards to the small nation are relatively in sync, should North Korea begin to act in a more volatile fashion, China and America will be faced with difficult decisions.

China has to worry about North Korea going nuclear for the same reason that they should fear Iran's nuclear program. If nations are allowed to proliferate outside of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) then what is to stop Japan from proliferating? A nuclear Japan is something that China desperately wants to avoid and aside from the instability a nuclear North Korea would bring to the region, Japan alone is reason enough to force China's hand.

However, China would still rather a stable, nuclear North Korea than a politically volatile one for both economic and strategic reasons. Economically, bilateral trade between the two nations reached 2.79 billion in 2008 which was up 41.3% from the year before. China accounts for nearly 90% of North Korea's energy imports, 80% of its consumer goods, and 45% of its food imports.� China is North Korea's most important ally and virtually the only 'friend' it has left on the international scene. China and North Korea's relationship is further bolstered by the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which obliges China to defend North Korea against unprovoked aggression.� How this will play out in the event of Pyongyang becoming involved in a conflict is anyone's guess as the wording of the treaty is decidedly ambiguous. It would be prudent to assume that should a situation arise where the invocation of the Treaty is required, China will ensure that its reaction protects its own national interests first and foremost.

North Korea also serves as a strategic interest for China. China and North Korea share an 800 mile border and any political or economic insecurity in North Korea could send an influx of refugees over the border into China, a situation China would desperately like to avoid.� The launch of both North Korea's missile tests were within 150 miles of the Chinese border and most of North Korea's weapon facilities are located near the Chinese border as well. In the event that America is forced to invade North Korea to secure these sites, the refugees will be forced north, requiring China to build defences along the border, diverting military personnel and equipment away from the Taiwan Strait. Currently, North Korea acts as a natural buffer between China and the 29,000 US soldiers and marines stationed in South Korea, and China would be loathe to lose this breathing room.� One senior Chinese Military Officer asked an American envoy about this issue saying, 'How will you get there? Will you fight your way there?'�

It is evident that while preventing North Korea from going nuclear is a concern for both China and America, this is as far as their similarities go. China would rather keep the current regime in place in North Korea than risk a political meltdown and makes no real effort to hide this fact. China doesn't have the leverage over North Korea that many Americans believed, but this is a result of China's inwardly focused policies. China is not interested in influencing North Korea so much as it preserving the stability of the nation. Washington and Beijing strongly disagree on how to handle this rogue state. Sanctions and pressure tactics are seen as humiliating by China and, as we'll see in Iran, China is reluctant to impose economic restrictions that only stand to benefit the States while harming China.� China has too much invested in North Korea to withdraw entirely and like Taiwan and the 2012 elections, this issue will depend entirely on the actions of a state other than China or the US.

Iran

China's ties with Iran are perhaps the most worrisome of all the issues presented thus far. Like North Korea, Iran also resents the perceived hegemonic dominance of the United States and has consistently ignored American warnings about their nuclear program. While China recently expressed their displeasure with Iran's uranium enrichment plants, it is unlikely that this will translate into much more than a stern wag of the finger. The issue, simply, is business. Iran has been shunned by the West and has turned to the East for support and friendship and they have found the welcoming market of China. Like in North Korea, China has much more to lose than America if strict UN sanctions are put in place on the Islamic theocracy. What makes the Iran issue such a significant one is that China and Iran do much more business than North Korea and China. Iran is arguably the most influential actor in the Middle East and the repercussions of instability in Iran would be much more significant than they would in North Korea.

China is Iran's biggest oil market and in turn Iran has built China as one of its biggest trading partners, providing access to a young population that has doubled since the Islamic revolution.� Chinese ambassador to Iran Lio G. Tan highlighted the importance of the Iranian market for China, noting that, 'the abundant natural resources, big market, geographical location, and educated workforce are among relative advantages of Iran.'� One of the best examples of Sino-Iranian economic cooperation is the bilateral 25 year liquefied natural gas contract worth 100 billion USD on top of the 150,000 barrels of crude oil that are sold daily to China at market prices.� Iran and China did more than 25 billion USD in bilateral trade in 2008 and China is Iran's second largest trading partner after Germany. Since January of this year China and Iran have struck two more energy-related deals; one to develop the North Azadegan oil field in Western Iran and the other to produce liquefied natural gas in Iran's South Pars natural gas field, these deals were worth 1.76 billion and 3.39 billion USD respectively.�

China's economic investment in Iran is more than just for economic gain. America has virtually no ties with Iran and China sees the Islamic Republic not only as a potential ally, but also as a bulwark against what China suspects is an American plan to maintain global dominance by controlling Middle Eastern energy supplies.� While China did recently condemn Iran's nuclear program, past sanction talks in the UN have resulted in China only agreeing to sanctions after stronger American measures had been significantly watered down, and it is likely this trend will continue. China recognizes that condemning these attacks gives their image a boost as a global diplomatic leader, but China is very aware that sanctions against Iran really only benefit America.� China's economic investment in Iran has led to a synergy of economic and strategic interests in the region. China is planning on constructing a 620 mile pipeline to the Caspian Sea which will connect with the planned pipeline between China and Kazakhstan. This proposal subverts staunch US attempts to redirect the Baku-Tbilsi-Ceyahn pipeline away from Tehran and undercut the Islamic regime's attempts at exporting its oil.� This investment was made by China in recognition of the fact that its sea lines of energy transport are very vulnerable to disruption and in the event of conflict with the US, the original Arabian pipelines could be easily cut by a US naval blockade.� Similarly in August of 2005 Beijing announced that it would be willing to spend 4.18 billion USD to acquire Petro-Kazakhstan, a Canadian-owned corporation with significant oil holdings in Central Asia. The deal has been put on hold by Canadian courts, but if the deal ultimately goes through it would represent China's largest foreign acquisition to date.�

Beyond simple economics, China's nuclear cooperation with Iran is also a cause for concern. Going back to the 1980s when Beijing supplied Tehran with a small training reactor and calutrons to be used for the experimental separation of uranium isotopes, Chinese involvement in Iran's nuclear program has been relatively prominent.� There were a number of bilateral agreements signed between Tehran and Beijing in the 1990s as well as an increasing anxiety on behalf of Washington as to China's role in the Islamic Republic's nuclear ambitions. In 1997 Beijing pledged to Washington that it would cease all nuclear cooperation with Iran, however, there have been many reports since this pledge that the Chinese government and a number of private Chinese firms have continued to supply nuclear equipment and material to the Islamic Republic.� Beijing's transfer of weapon systems and technical expertise to Iran has traditionally been one of the most troubling aspects of the Sino-Iranian relationship. Though the exact quality and quantity of weaponry is debatable, it can be argued that China has played an important role in supplying the Iranian military since the early 1980s. According to some sources, Iran is behind only Pakistan and North Korea as the largest recipient of Chinese arms and technology.� It is very obvious, if China's three largest importers of arms are Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, why America looks at China with a little more than apprehension.

Conclusion

Despite China's attempt at rising peacefully and avoiding direct confrontation with the United States, the aforementioned issues demonstrate that inevitably these two giants will find themselves in some kind of confrontation. This is not to say that China and America will engage in any kind of military action against one another, nor do I believe that some sort of 'new Cold War' will emerge. However, as China's presence grows on the world stage, it cannot help but take up some of the room previously occupied by the United States. How this confrontation plays out will be a product of many different variables and thus impossible to predict but the fact remains that China's 'peaceful rise' cannot avoid contention with the United States. By pursuing stronger ties with Taiwan while ensuring mainland China that this is not being done at their expense, America can help pacify the situation in the Pacific. A resumption of the six-party talks with North Korea can help to not only bring stability to North Korea, but also open up a solid dialogue between the US and China on non-proliferation. China has recognized that it too has much to lose if Iran goes nuclear, namely the disruption of oil supply from the Middle East. Based on this, America may be able to establish more cooperative ties on the Iranian nuclear issue but only if they can find a resolution that is mutually beneficial. The current sanctions only serve America's interests and China is unlikely to pursue any paths that allow America to assert dominant control over the region.

China cannot help but step on a few toes as it expands, but this doesn't have to mean conflict. While China and America's interests and markedly divergent at present, China's role on the world stage is still relatively young and it still has much to learn about diplomacy. The recent condemnation of Iran's nuclear program is a step in the right direction but it is one of many. America and China need to recognize the stark cultural differences between the two nations and understand that diplomacy as it has been carried out in the past may no longer fit this situation. Modern history has never seen two powers rise up and co-exist in peace, and extraordinary circumstances must be met with extraordinary methods.

References

Bajoria, Jayshree. "The China-North Korea Relationship." Council on Foreign Relations 1.1 (2009).

Banyan. "Barack Obama's Asian Adventure." The Economist 12 Nov. 2009: 42.

"China, North Korea and its nukes: Smile, please." The Economist 8 Oct. 2009: 12-13.

Ching, Frank. "Missiles Crimp Taiwan's Thoughts of Peace." The Japan Times 3 Nov. 2009: A1+.

Christensen, Thomas J. "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." International Security 23.4 (1999): 49-80.

Economy, Elizabeth C., and Adam Segal. "The G2 Mirage: Why the United States and China are not Ready to Upgrade Ties." Foreign Affairs 88.14 (2009).

Gentry, J. B. "The Dragon and the Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations in the 21st Century." The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3.3 (2005): 111-25.

Glaser, Bonnie S. "What Hu Jintao Should Expect." Centre for Strategic and International Studies 1 (05 Jan. 2005): 2-4.

Mearsheimer, John J. Tragedy of Great Power politics. New York: Norton, 2001.

Miller, James. "The Odd Couple." The Economist 24 Oct. 2009: 1-14.

Powell, Bill. "Why China Won't Get Tough on Iran." Time 18 Nov. 2009.

Rajan, DS. "China Worried Over US-India Military Cooperation." Academic Search Premier. JSTOR, 24 Sept. 2009. Web. 18 Nov. 2009.

Ramo, Joshua C. The Beijing Consensus. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.

Takeyh, Ray. Hidden Iran Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. New York: Times Books, 2006.

"US Calls on China for 'Strategic Reassurance'" Voice of America. 24 Sept. 2009. Web. 14 Oct. 2009. <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-24-voa57-68821807.html>.

Wines, Michael. "China's Ties With Iran Complicate Diplomacy." New York Times 29 Sept. 2009: A14.

Wright, Robin. "Iran's New Alliance With China Could Cost US Leverage." Washington Post 17 Nov. 2005: A21.

Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-American World. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.

� Fareed Zakaria. The Post-American World. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009. 89

� Though the DIA, CIA and many NGOs claim China is not fully disclosing the amount it spends on defence, consequently these may not be entirely accurate figures.

� James Miller. "The Odd Couple." The Economist 24 Oct. 2009, 4

� Zakaria, Post-American World, 107

� While I understand this is an odd description to use, I came across several sources in my research which argued that due to China's secular population (only 28% of Chinese citizens believe that belief in God is important compared to 57% of Americans), their foreign policy may not be as outwardly focused as predominantly Christian or Muslim nations.

� John J. Mearsheimer. Tragedy of Great Power politics. New York: Norton, 2001. 35

� Zakaria, Post American World, 103.

� James Miler, 'The Odd Couple'

� Joshua C. Ramo, Joshua. The Beijing Consensus. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004

� J. B. Gentry. "The Dragon and the Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations in the 21st Century." The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3.3 (2005), 120

� Zakaria Post-American World, 114 China is extending its influence in Africa through more than just investment, some go so far as to deem it subversion. For example Nigeria was promised 5 million USD from the World Bank if it cleaned up its notoriously corrupt railway bureaucracy. The deal was almost complete when the Chinese government stepped in and offered the government a 9 billion dollar loan to rebuild the entire train system, the World Bank was sent home in days. China has adopted a similar tact in Zimbabwe, buying platinum and ore from Mugabe and in turn, sells the President weapons and radio-jamming devices (despite a US and European ban). In Sudan China's involvement runs even deeper and has invested 3 billion USD in Sudanese oil fields and purchases 65% of Sudan's oil exports and maintains a military alliance with Sudan despite UN restrictions.

� Zakaria, Post-American World, 117

� Zakaria, Post-American World, 120. In fact, even the results from Australia has China and America very close to one another in terms of who can be trusted to wield this power

� Banyan. "Barack Obama's Asian Adventure." The Economist 12 Nov. 2009: 42

� DS Rajan. "China Worried Over US-India Military Cooperation." Academic Search Premier. JSTOR, 24 Sept. 2009. Web. 18 Nov. 2009

� DS Rajan 'China Worried Over US-India Military Cooperation'

� Joshua Ramo. The Beijing Consensus.

� James Miller, 'The Odd Couple'

� James Miller, 'The Odd Couple'. This may well chip away at America's sense of scientific superiority, adding to worries aroused in 2005 when a panel commissioned by Congress gave warning that America was losing its technological edge, citing a statistic showing that China produces 600,000 engineering graduates a year to America's 70,000

� Bonnie S. Glaser, Bonnie S. "What Hu Jintao Should Expect." Centre for Strategic and International Studies 1 (05 Jan. 2005)

� James Miller, 'The Odd Couple'

� Bonnie S. Glaser, Bonnie. "What Hu Jintao Should Expect."

�Frank Ching. "Missiles Crimp Taiwan's Thoughts of Peace." The Japan Times 3 Nov. 2009: A1.

� "US Calls on China for 'Strategic Reassurance'" Voice of America. 24 Sept. 2009. Web. 14 Oct. 2009.

�Frank Ching, 'Missiles Crimp Taiwan's Thoughts of Peace'

� President George H W Bush sold Taiwan 150 f-16s in the early 1990s, which was substantially more than the amount allowed by the treaties and China did little in response. It would be naïve to assume that China would have the same lackadaisical attitude if this were to happen again

� Frank Ching 'Missiles Crimp Taiwan's Thoughts of Peace'

� James Miller 'The Odd Couple'

� James Miller 'The Odd Courple'

� Frank Ching 'Missiles Crimp Taiwan's Thoughts of Peace'

� Bonnie S. Glaser What Hu Jintao Should Expect' President Ma's popularity is already waning due to his perceived incompetence at handing the aftermath of a typhoon that swept through Taiwan earlier this year. He has also received a lot of criticism for his handling of the recession.

� "US Calls on China for 'Strategic Reassurance'" Voice of America.

� The mid-1990s saw the two nuclear countries inch towards military confrontation over Taiwan due to China testing missiles in dangerous proximity to the Island. This was also an instance where negotiation and diplomacy had failed and both countries relied on shows of military capability rather than discussion.

� An example of China's desire to prevent North Korea from going nuclear can be found with the 'Six Party Talks'. Created by the Chinese, these talks include both North and South Korea, China, America, Russia, and Japan and was founded as a joint effort to control North Korea's nuclear program after their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 2003.

� Jayshree Bajoria. "The China-North Korea Relationship." Council on Foreign Relations 1.1 (2009).

� Jayshree Bajoria 'The China-North Korea Relationship'

� "China, North Korea and its nukes: Smile, please." The Economist 8 Oct. 2009

� 'China, North Korea and its nukes: Smile, please.' The Economist

� Economy, Elizabeth C., and Adam Segal. "The G2 Mirage: Why the United States and China are not Ready to Upgrade Ties." Foreign Affairs 88.14 (2009).

� Jayshree Bajoria, ''The China-North Korea Relationship'

� James Mills 'The Odd Couple'

� Ray Takeyh. Hidden Iran Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. New York: Times Books, 2006, 112

� Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran Paradox 113

� Bill Powell, 'Why China Won't Get Tough on Iran'

� James Miller 'The Odd Couple'

� James Miller 'The Odd Couple'

� Michael Wines. "China's Ties With Iran Complicate Diplomacy." New York Times 29 Sept. 2009: A14.

� J.B. Gentry. "The Dragon and the Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations in the 21st Century." The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3.3 (2005), 122

� J.B. Gentry 'The Dragon and the Magi', 131

� J.B. Gentry 'The Dragon and the Magi', 131

� Robin Wright. "Iran's New Alliance With China Could Cost US Leverage." Washington Post 17 Nov. 2005: A21

� J.B. Gentry 'The Dragon and the Magi' 134.

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