The Organisation of (Arab) Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC)'s move to raise oil prices and to limit output and distribution to the Western world came at a time when there was a rapid growth of demand for oil in the United States due in part to Nixon's anti-inflation policies, and other factors such as new environmental restrictions on coal burning. The US had lowered its import barriers and became more dependent on the world market, mainly the Middle East, than ever before. In 1973, panic buying of oil was already raising the prices. However, the share of revenues for the oil exporters had been decreasing and the prices were unguaranteed, and so it was demanded that the price agreement be promptly rewritten. The shift of power from the oil companies to the oil exporting countries was by this time in full swing. These state of affairs opened the door for the comparative success of the oil weapon, which before had decidedly failed during the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War.
The changing conditions coincided with the political developments between Israel and Egypt.
The political oil weapon is defined in this essay as the manipulation of oil price and production in order to wield power over the international system. For many years before, the oil weapon had been thought of as a way to achieve Arab objectives regarding Israel and with the coming of the war in 1973 its moment had come. It was also a way to further grander aims on the part of OPEC, as laid out below. This was a political motive, but it was also one heavily intertwined with economics. There will be a discussion of aims, successes and failures in both sections of the essay, starting with the Arab-Israeli motive and then OPEC's.
Only the relatively immediate...