Has the Task Force offered useful recommendations to address the problem?
After carefully and intricately identifying the problem of strategic communication, the Task Force offered 7 (9) recommendations in the report to help change the problem. After carefully reviewing the problem presented before the United States government we feel that these recommendations are not what would solve the communication problem of the Government at this time.
These recommendations although valid, would have worked pre-9/11. After the attacks on the Twin Towers the actions of the United States Government began to foster great opposition in the Middle East. In 2002, as the Task Force reports in charts (pg 44-45) most of the Middle Eastern Countries were still in favor of the U.S foreign policies, as the years progressed and a poll was taken again in 2004, the number of supporters in these countries had dropped by an overwhelming half and in some countries even more.
The Task Force correctly identifies that many Soft Opposition Muslims have changed in a matter of 2 years to Hard Opposition Muslims. This is startling because as we continue our onslaught to constitutionally liberalize the Middle East we are increasingly shunned.
Many of the recommendations set forth by the Task Force imply the starting of separate branch, or sector of government. To top that off it also increases the burden on the Department of State to supervise this new sector of government. These particular recommendations (1, 2, 3) won't work. The reason we think so is because it pressures the Department of State and the Department of Defense to constantly watch and partake in surveys, polls, and discovery meetings where the departments have to give up pertinent, and in many cases classified information, so that in the grand scheme it can be shared worldwide.